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“Fate has brought it about that America is at the center, no 
longer the edges, of Western civilization. In this fact resides the 
American destiny.” 
—Walter Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, 1944  
Part 1 
Near mid-century the most influential journalist of the age, Walter Lippmann, [1] 
appealed for a foreign policy rooted in American ―vital interests‖ rather than a 
―fundamentalist‖ idealism. Even as he crafted a more realistic, less moralistic foreign 
policy, Lippmann was famously developing his controversial public philosophy grounded 
on a universal Natural Law. [2] At this intersection between a nation oriented around 
self-evident Truth and an international order ruled by naked power and interests, Walter 
Lippmann produced a hard-headed via media lamentably rare in an ideological age. We 
have much to learn from this great American stoic whose life‘s work was to educate 
dispassionately a passionate public. 
A review of Lippmann‘s mature thinking about America‘s role in the world, crafted in the 
midst of a world war and the subsequent and titanic shift in geopolitics, offers a useful 
primer on American foreign policy and vital interests that avoids the wild arrogance and 
self-deception of American idealism without succumbing to the simplistic positivism of 
the various realists. As we struggle to find a useful and politically viable strategy in a 
new global struggle for civilization, Lippmann‘s work at mid-century supplies a much-
neglected analysis from which we might critique contemporary foreign policy. To this 
end I want to offer a summary of Lippmann‘s analysis of American strategic position and 
role before I offer an update for our own time. 
The young Lippmann, enthralled by Theodore Roosevelt‘s muscular internationalism, 
offered sustained but tepid support for Woodrow Wilson‘s collective security, 
international law, and evangelical democratization. By the late 1930s the now hoary-
headed dean of American journalism had rejected Wilsonianism along with his own long 
record of idealist internationalism. [3] In 1952 Lippmann characterized Wilsonianism 
with his usual candor: 
The Wilsonian ideology was President Wilson‘s attempt to reconcile these new and 
heretical imperatives [by which he meant German violations of Wilson‘s understanding 
of international law] with the old, with his own deeply personal American orthodoxy. The 
Wilsonian thesis was, if I may put it this way, that since the world was no longer safe for 
the American democracy, the American people were called upon to conduct a crusade 
to make the world safe for American democracy. In order to do this the principles of the 
American democracy would have to be made universal throughout the world. The 
Wilsonian ideology is American fundamentalism made into a universal doctrine. [4] 
This label, ―American fundamentalism,‖ is a bit elusive in Lippmann‘s works but 
nonetheless central to his analysis. A variant of American idealism, fundamentalism 
refers to a peculiar kind of provincialism—a tendency to take American political ideas 
and forms as expressions of universal truth. A more cosmopolitan grasp of the world 
and its history prevents the simple transformation of an American good to a human 
good. Lippmann‘s critique of Wilson rests heavily on his assertion that Wilson‘s ―deeply 
personal American orthodoxy‖ prevented him from understanding the distinctions that 
matter and instead fostered a simple and declarative vision of America‘s role in the 
world. 
The underlying problem toward which Lippmann pointed is that Wilson (and American 
fundamentalists generally) was incapable of innovating, of adjusting to changed 
circumstances. [5] Wilson took America to war by calling upon a deeply felt, little 
understood, and altogether antiquated ―American fundamentalism‖ that was ill-suited to 
the world as it was really. American experiences in the nineteenth century had created 
habits of mind that no longer worked in the more globalized economy and politics of the 
twentieth century. In reaction to the ―heresy‖ of international politics, Wilson and the 
Americans transformed a long-established national idealism into ―a crusading doctrine‖ 
and made all American wars ―universal‖ wars ―against criminal governments who rebel 
against the universal order.‖ [6] 
II 
As a young thinker, Lippmann was not disposed to rely heavily on history or historical 
imagination to shape his analysis of current events or needs. The failures or 
deficiencies in his own views and in American policies spurred Lippmann to examine 
history more closely, and in 1943, when he published U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic, he surveyed American foreign policy history, without which most of his 
analysis would have been seemed capricious or unsupported. [7] One cannot 
understand or seek to correct American foreign policy without asking the question of the 
nature of the American republic and the kind of self-understanding that governs political 
choices. Is the nation constitutionally or ―genetically‖ isolationist? Is it an imperialist 
nation? The two questions come bound together for Lippmann. The first generation of 
leaders—for whom Lippmann developed over time a grudging but deep admiration—
focused their foreign policy attention on the vital interests of the new nation, which 
included the conquering of a continent and turning it into a great, self-governing 
republic. Their understanding of America‘s vital interests and their ―idealism‖ made the 
first generation anything but isolationists—they had a vast expanse to conquer. [8] To 
concentrate on this vast undertaking, they sought to avoid entanglements with 
European or Asian affairs on the ground that such involvement would distract them from 
securing their vital interests and would place upon them obligations for which they 
hadn‘t the resources. 
Meanwhile, they had an ―empire‖ (of liberty, as Jefferson called it) to build, and to 
accomplish this they had often to engage seriously with European nations. But the 
imperialism of this enterprise was of a very specific variety. The object was to create a 
nation of self-governing people. The size of this conquest was determined not primarily 
by the presence of countervailing forces that would prevent U.S. expansion, but by the 
limits (probably unknown at the time) to producing states that were culturally and 
geographically capable of participating in a single republic. The empire of free, self-
governing people, therefore, was not an abstract claim applied to all peoples 
everywhere, much less a political imperative of the United States. It presupposed limits 
(even if the exact nature of those limits was not clear yet) and it presumed that it was in 
the interest of the United States to become a great and hegemonic nation in the 
hemisphere. 
In their wisdom, early American leaders identified clearly and prudently the ―vital 
interests‖ of the nation and developed a foreign policy that secured those interests. 
They kept their commitments and their resources in balance. One of the great 
accomplishments in this balancing act was the Monroe Doctrine, which Lippmann 
asserted was the defining event in America‘s nineteenth-century foreign policy. But the 
Monroe Doctrine was not about, as some have asserted, a weak United States 
asserting a claim to the western hemisphere that it could not defend. Rather, Lippmann 
emphasized the careful calculations that informed the proclamation. American leaders 
could not have, and would not have, asserted the obligation to protect the Americas 
from European incursions had it not had the support of Great Britain, along with the 
protection of the British navy. Indeed, for a time it seemed likely that what is known 
today as the Monroe Doctrine would come in the form of a joint declaration between the 
United States and Great Britain. At any rate, the salient fact is that American policy 
makers assessed well the strategic needs of the U.S. and Great Britain and declared a 
U.S. sphere of influence that was safeguarded by the British navy. The U.S. 
government determined America‘s vital interests and through alliance (tacit though it 
was) it secured the necessary means of discharging its obligations. 
The diplomatic success of 1823 provided the necessary conditions for the United States 
to establish its ―empire of liberty‖ on the North American continent in splendid isolation 
from heavy European influence. It also produced such complete and unusual (even 
unnatural) security that these halcyon years of the nineteenth century shaped for the 
next century American beliefs and habits concerning diplomacy. The American people 
and U.S. policy makers lost contact with the basic truth that the nation must balance its 
commitments with resources just as they forgot that the great era of ―isolation‖ 
depended on an alliance with Great Britain. ―Because the informal alliance with British 
sea power was concealed,‖ Lippmann wrote in 1943, ―and was displeasing to their self-
esteem, the American people lost the prudence, so consistently practised by the 
Founding Fathers, of not underestimating the risks of their commitments and of not 
overestimating their own power.‖ [9] 
The long diplomatic peace had warped the ability of American policy leaders to assess 
their vital interests and to create the conditions that would best meet the obligations 
they incurred. This habituated stupidity, along with a rapidly changing geopolitical 
environment, would lead to American diplomatic failures from 1898 until 1941, of which 
Wilsonianism was the deformed reaction of a growing giant, naïve in the ways of the 
world. This American fundamentalism was the problem with American foreign policy. 
[10] 
The Spanish-American War provoked the problem that Lippmann thought not yet solved 
as America entered World War II. Had it not been for this ―splendid little war,‖ the 
American government would nonetheless have faced geopolitical changes that would 
force upon it a new foreign policy. One way or another, the time of American isolation 
was ending, but the war with Spain exposed the tensions within a nation dedicated to 
the idea of national independence and a peculiar kind of empire—an empire of liberty. 
The victory bequeathed to the United States a new kind of empire in the Pacific for 
which it didn‘t have the necessary resources to protect. The Philippines could not be 
incorporated into the American republic and so the American government promised 
quickly to move toward Philippine independence—there was a difference between an 
―empire of liberty‖ and a liberal imperialism. [11] Meanwhile, the vast Pacific obligations 
could not be vouchsafed by the British navy. America was now strategically 
overexposed: ―From the day when Dewey sailed into Manila Bay until the day when 
General Wainwright surrendered Corregidor, the United States never made a sustained 
and prudent, or remotely adequate, effort to bring its obligations and its power into 
balance.‖ [12] 
Theodore Roosevelt, in Lippmann‘s estimation, had begun to formulate the rudiments of 
an American strategic plan for this new age, and had his insights become the 
foundation for an emerging American strategy for the twentieth century, we would have 
experienced a very different century. But Roosevelt was an aberration, a cosmopolitan 
among American provincials. It would fall to the provincial Wilson, who confronted the 
unavoidable questions about America‘s way with the world, to formulate an American 
strategy for this new century of global conflict and deeply entangled global economy. 
The real reason that the U.S. went to war with Germany in 1917, Lippmann argued, was 
not to make the world safe for democracy or to defend international law. These were the 
stated reasons, the moral justifications, the way that Wilson persuaded himself and his 
nation of the necessity for this conflict. The real reason was that the new German 
submarine offensive was ―cutting . . . the Atlantic communication‖ and this would mean 
―the starvation of Britain and, therefore, the conquest of Western Europe by imperial 
Germany.‖ This victory would directly threaten American interests and make ―the world 
unsafe for the American democracies from Canada to Argentina.‖ So American security 
rather than American idealism sent the United States into a European conflict, but the 
―legalistic and moralistic, and idealistic‖ justifications for American involvement obscured 
the compelling vital interests involved (the U.S. could not allow Germany mastery over 
the Atlantic) as well as distorted the kind of peace that would serve American security 
interests. [13] 
Three-quarters of a century of blissful separation from European affairs had trained 
American policy makers to think that the object of foreign policy and of war is peace, 
and by emphasizing this erroneous objective, American leaders were distracted from 
the first object of a nation‘s foreign engagement: security. Living for so long with an 
unearned peace and security, Americans were unwilling to think of the necessary 
defenses for their real needs and they were disposed to ignore their enemies. A 
distorted American idealism resulted in a pathetic effort to outlaw war following the 
Great War. Thinking that excessive armaments produced the recent conflict, they 
pushed to effectively disarm the major powers, seemingly unaware of the needs of 
nations to have the power to protect their vital interests. Giving nations commitments 
while taking away their capacity to fulfill their obligations produces more instability rather 
than less. Hating alliances as sources of conflict, the American fundamentalists 
undermined the means by which a nation might distinguish friend and foe and 
hampered the ability of a nation to use alliances to protect vital interests. To replace the 
decadently self-interested alliance system, the fundamentalist sought a more neutral 
system of collective security. In short, Lippmann stressed that the unusual experience of 
Americans in the nineteenth century produced a certain species of idealism and that 
they generalized from an atypical and unrepeatable set of circumstances which they 
universalized as moral principles for nations as such. [14] 
The other side of this coin is that an emphasis on a neutral system of collective security, 
as well as efforts to produce an international environment that stresses idealism rather 
than self-interest, alters the proper focus of the American government. Stressing the 
importance of understanding and defining clearly the nation‘s vital interests, Lippmann 
thought that the species of internationalism that emerged after the war not only clouded 
America‘s understanding of its own interests but also made policy makers blind to the 
centrality of self-interest to all nations‘ foreign policy. American policy makers were both 
incapable of developing a foreign policy that established the necessary resources to 
protect American vital interests and unable to understand the actions of other nations 
that did not operate with American fundamentalist notions. 
This American idealism, this liberal fundamentalism, had made World War II possible. 
As Lippmann wrote in the middle of the war, thinking about what had caused this 
conflagration and what the nation should learn from this history, he sought to uncover 
the appropriate goals of American foreign policy as well as the immediate war aims. 
Clearly Lippmann wanted policy makers to eschew the fundamentalism that had 
brought them to this state of affairs. Recognizing the peculiar challenges of policy 
decisions in a democracy, Lippmann called for leadership that educates the public and 
that creates consensus by producing sound policy and then educating the public as to 
its merits. [15] But Lippmann also had to acknowledge a basic idealism as central to the 
American character and therefore to any foreign policy that the people would tolerate. 
Lippmann‘s ―realism‖ requires understanding the nature of the regime, especially for the 
person called to lead the nation in a ruthless international game of power politics, where 
power rather than ideals is the main currency. 
Lippmann wrote often about American idealism, but rarely in any sustained fashion. 
What he did write emphasized a basic character, a living American tradition, but not a 
fixed position. American ideals, deeply held, are capable of many kinds of articulation 
and therefore they can change with public expressions of them, especially when 
attached to American fighting. Therefore, Lippmann thought it very important for 
American leaders to articulate the sources for our struggle, the ideals for our fight, in 
very careful ways because these public statements, when distilled through national 
sacrifice, will alter or shape the national character. 
America‘s long history fighting colonial imperialism has produced a core belief in 
national independence. Lippmann wrote: ―The American antipathy to imperialism is not 
a humanitarian sentiment acquired in some casual way. It is organic in the American 
character, and is transmitted on American soil to all whose minds are molded by the 
American tradition.‖ [16] Americans are sufficiently evangelical about such matters to go 
to war in defense of their beliefs. As Lippmann understood American policy toward 
Japan in the years leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. pursued a policy 
designed to lead to war with Japan in the interest of Chinese independence. American 
policy toward China, beginning with the Open Door policy, was not a matter of American 
vital interest and it wasn‘t focused on profits or economic gain. Once Japan‘s intention 
to occupy much of China became clear and unchangeable, U.S. policy aimed at an 
equally unchanging course of defense of Chinese territorial integrity. While the timing of 
a war might be dicey (with the fate of Great Britain very much in doubt), American 
actions could only lead to war. Why? Was this an expression of American idealism 
controlling foreign policy? 
Lippmann‘s answer suggests the complexity of the issue. Americans are, indeed, 
deeply idealistic with regard to the wrongs of imperialism. But the American principles at 
stake are not quite the same as those claimed by Woodrow Wilson or by Franklin 
Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter, and certainly not what Truman would declare later. As 
Lippmann put it, ―it would be quixotic and almost certainly obnoxious, to go crusading in 
order to impose American institutions and the American ideas of liberty and equal 
rights.‖ Clearly the American character did not require, in its most basic form, that the 
world look like us. ―We have come to realize,‖ he stressed, ―how long and troubled is the 
road to freedom and self-government.‖ More like Burke than Paine in his defense of 
American ideals, Lippmann pointed out that this more restrained sentiment in favor of 
national independence had been a long-standing position of the American people. 
―Thus, the Monroe Doctrine is not a guarantee that all the people of the American 
republics would enjoy freedom; it is a policy which vetoes the attempt of any other 
power to prevent them from trying to be free. We have not undertaken to unite the 
Chinese and to make them free and self-governing. Only the Chinese can do that. What 
we have undertaken is to prevent Japan from conquering them.‖ [17] 
So American foreign policy, because it is American, will always reflect American moral 
commitments. The challenge for the nation is to develop an enlightened leadership that 
can ―adjust, transform, and convert traditional American ideas to the new necessities.‖ 
[18] Clearly Wilsonian fundamentalism (which is the universalizing of American moral 
principles) was inappropriate. In the emerging world of American hegemony, what blend 
of realism and idealism should guide this democratic nation? 
Notes to Part I 
1. Walter Lippmann was one of America‘s most independent public intellectuals. He 
belonged to no camp. Courted by almost every great political figure in America 
during his career, Lippmann sustained his influence by protecting his singularity. 
This independence of mind and spirit cost him the virtue of consistency, but in 
return he gained the precious capacity to learn from all evidence, even that 
resulting from his own failures in judgment. By the time the Second World War 
loomed, Walter Lippmann had been commenting on foreign relations for nearly a 
quarter of a century. From the late 1930s through the early 1950s he articulated a 
philosophy to govern American foreign policy that differed significantly from his 
earlier positions and from the emerging schools of thought. 
2. Essays in the Public Philosophy. Boston, Little, Brown, 1944. 
3. Lippmann stressed that the new century had brought about ―revolutionary change‖ 
and that because the U.S. had not adjusted to fit these new conditions it ―has for 
forty years been unprepared to wage war or to make peace.‖ Moreover, about his 
own defense for Wilsonian ideas, including the Washington Disarmament 
Conference, Lippmann wrote that ―of that episode in my life I am ashamed.‖ (U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, pp. vii, x.) 
4. Isolation and Alliances: An American Speaks to the British. Boston: Little, Brown, 
1952, p. 22. 
5. George Bush is the most recent, and the most bombastic, example of a liberal 
fundamentalism that affirms the moral superiority of democracy (liberal democracy) 
and therefore justifies ―crusades‖ to make the world safe for democracy. But 
beyond a stronger than typical predilection to attach both divine assistance and a 
sense of providential purpose to American actions, Bush stands very much in the 
American tradition of presidential pronouncements about the American mission, 
more or less unchallenged since Franklin Roosevelt. 
6. Isolation and Alliances. pp. 22–23. 
7. ―This nation cannot, as Lincoln said, escape history. It can, however, at fearful cost 
misread it own history.‖ U.S. Foreign Policy. p. 108. 
8. Lippmann warned that the label ―isolationism‖ was prone to misinterpretation. The 
United States was never ―neutral‖ and to the degree that the isolationist label has 
come to mean neutrality, it misrepresents American history. Isolation and Alliances. 
p. 14. 
9. U.S Foreign Policy. p. 22 
10. Lippmann words his claims in the strongest terms possible: ―All American military 
commitments had been made by the end of the nineteenth century. The history of 
our foreign relations in the twentieth century is a story of failure. It is the story of our 
national failure to balance the commitments that were made in the nineteenth 
century. Because of that failure we have been compelled to fight two great 
unexpected wars for which we were unprepared.‖ U.S Foreign Policy, p. 26. 
11. ―Americans have never wanted to rule over any territory which could not be 
admitted as a state into the union or to govern the peoples who could not be 
assimilated.‖ Isolation and Alliances, p. 19. 
12. U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 28 
13. Lippmann‘s argument about the causes of American involvement in the war, 
however debatable, is not central to the issue here. For him the salient issue is that 
American liberal, fundamentalist habits of mind, American idealistic provincialism, 
controlled the way the American government settled the peace. The failure to 
identify America‘s vital interests, the inability to recognize the singularity of the 
American republic, and the amazingly cavalier way that Wilson ignored the 
relationship between commitments and resources, produced a European 
catastrophe for which the United States bears considerable guilt. 
14. See chapter five of U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic. 
15. Lippmann assumed that there is no such thing as a serious public opinion until 
leaders present the people with options from which to choose. The obligation is 
then on leaders to educate rather than pander, to unite by the quality of their 
policies rather than the narrow self-interest of their constituencies. Probably, more 
than anyone else, Theodore Roosevelt remained his model for this kind of leader. 
But in his works on foreign policy, Lippmann seems to assert the importance of 
enlightened leadership rather than explaining what it might look like or how we 
might encourage it. With regard to the American founders he wrote that ―they 
formulated a sound policy which the divided people came, because of its inherent 
virtue, to unite in supporting.‖ A bit later, in a rather desperate attempt to avoid 
making a detailed argument, he wrote that ―the measure of a policy is its 
soundness; if it is sound, it will prove acceptable.‖ (Shield p. 85) However elusive 
one finds Lippmann‘s efforts to explain the kind of leadership needed in a 
democracy, one cannot make sense of his views without recognizing his basic debt 
to Machiavelli on this subject, made much more important in a democracy. 
16. U.S. War Aims, Boston: Little, Brown, 1944, p. 35. 
17. U.S. War Aims, pp. 41–42. 
18. Isolation and Alliances, p. 20. 
  
Part 2 
III 
As Walter Lippmann espied the end of World War II in 1944, he wrote a book that he 
hoped would go beyond the diagnosis of the problem Americans had inherited from its 
liberal fundamentalism and chart a more hard-headed approach in the future. In U.S. 
War Aims, he stressed the importance of defining the nation‘s vital interests and 
establishing a ―settled national policy‖ that would develop the ―efficient means‖ to 
protect those interests. This was not a book fixated on American idealism, except as a 
fact to be managed by leaders. Rather, Lippmann returned to what in his mind was the 
first objective of foreign policy, security. [1] Emphasizing the natural groupings of 
nations around collective need, Lippmann stressed that the security of the United States 
would depend on building the necessary alliances with members of the ―Atlantic 
community‖ just as we could expect that other systems would emerge around Russia 
and China. Moralizing about other governments, evangelizing for democracy, self-
determination, international law, collective security, would only repeat the failures of the 
last generation, leading to a third world war. The most pressing question facing postwar 
policy makers was how to deal with the Soviets. In brief, Lippmann was appealing to 
these leaders to reject Wilsonian moralism in favor of a policy designed to form 
alliances and strike important power balances for a future to be governed by power not 
principles. 
The distance Lippmann had traveled from his Wilsonian days is even more evident in a 
letter he wrote to the French philosopher Jacques Maritain. Maritain had expressed 
admiration for Lippmann‘s critique of ―nineteenth-century idealism‖ but complained that 
the author should make a more ardent defense of ―a heroic effort of leadership from 
nations to defend the ideals of civilized society.‖ The philosopher wanted of Lippmann a 
―true realism‖ that accounted for the normative truths that were the foundation of all 
genuine civilization. Lippmann‘s response was direct: 
This was not, as you realize, due to an oversight of to a lack of interest in such an 
ultimate end. It was due to a deep conviction on a matter of fundamental principle. I do 
not believe that this end can be approached unless military power has first been 
organized for security against the threat of great wars. But I believe no less that it is 
wrong to suppose that out of the necessary work of the police there can evolve the 
creative work of civilization. The policeman must not be regarded as a potential priest, 
teacher, and constructer of the good life. He should be confined to the limited task of 
preserving an order within which the priest and teacher and constructer can proceed. 
After prolonged consideration of the question you raise I concluded, therefore, that if I 
was to propose and discuss the ultimate temporal end of society, I would have to make 
an historical and philosophical argument against the notions that it was the mission of 
the allied powers to rule the world in order to promote that end. . . . My view is that by 
resting the case for the alliance on the limited ground of their own self-interest, I was 
offering the only insurance that could be depended upon against the insidious 
temptation of imperialism to act as if the ultimate ends of human society were entrusted 
to the foreign offices in London, Moscow, Chungking, and Washington. In view of the 
fact that power corrupts men‘s minds, I was specially concerned to avoid the suggestion 
that the power we must exercise is an instrument for the attainment of ultimate ends. 
This could lead only, I believe, to a new version of Kipling and the white man‘s burden. 
[2] 
Lippmann‘s argument rested on two principles: security is the first need of all (and this is 
true of all regimes) and civilization (liberal democratic principles) has no peculiar 
advantage in the world beyond the ability of its devotees to defend it. [3] 
By emphasizing security needs in a world without moral codes to control nations, 
Lippmann was not rejecting a very potent form of idealism; he was simply emphasizing 
that the former (security) was a necessary condition for the latter (realization of idealistic 
principles). At the very end of U.S. War Aims Lippmann waxed idealistic. The ―American 
task‖ was to make a ―place where the ancient faith could flourish anew.‖ Moreover, 
American principles represented the highest accomplishments of human civilization, 
and for now and in the foreseeable future, fate had placed into the hands of Americans 
the great moral accomplishments of Western civilization: ―The Atlantic is now the 
Mediterranean sea of this culture and this faith.‖ [4] The preservation of this culture and 
faith should be among our highest priorities rather than a quixotic effort to apply these 
beliefs and values to peoples or regimes not prepared to adopt them. 
IV 
Less than two years after World War II ended, a new war—a cold war—had begun 
between the Soviet Union and the United States. Lippmann predicted some war 
between these powers in 1944 if Wilsonian ideals controlled American postwar policy. 
From Truman through Johnson (the time left to Lippmann as a serious commentator on 
world affairs) the American regime chose ideological confrontation over the possible 
―long peace.‖ 
The year 1947 was a fateful one for clarifying the American role in an emerging bipolar 
world. Hostilities between the United States and the USSR over the fate of Germany 
and the disposition of Eastern Europe were dangerously high while economic ruin in 
Western Europe created instability that communists sought to exploit. The British 
government, too poor to honor its global obligations, notified the Truman administration 
that Great Britain could no longer support the politically weak rightist government in 
Greece. Fearful that Greece might fall to communist rebellion, Truman appealed, in 
March, for a $400 million aid bill for both Greece and Turkey. Walter Lippmann, for his 
part, supported the aid bill because he considered it prudent assistance to allies in a 
part of the world that was in America‘s vital interest. 
But if aid to Greece and Turkey was prudent, the larger policy that Truman outlined in 
his speech before the joint session of Congress was extravagant, moralistic, and the 
worst kind of American fundamentalism. Or so Lippmann believed. The problem with 
the so-called Truman Doctrine was that it had no limits to its idealist imperialism—the 
U.S. government would henceforth consider it national policy ―to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.‖ 
The American crusade was now truly global. An unlimited crusade requires unlimited 
resources. Fundamentalists are driven by ideology, by a simple moral casuistry, that 
doesn‘t work well with efforts to separate vital interests from ancillary interests. 
Lippmann‘s reaction to Truman‘s declaration of ideological war against the Soviets was 
strong, insistent, and sharp. In one column, written almost immediately following 
Truman‘s speech, Lippmann warned that a ―vague global policy, which sounds like the 
tocsin of an ideological crusade has no limits. It cannot be controlled. Its effects cannot 
be predicted. Everyone everywhere will read into it his own fears and hopes, and it 
could readily act as incitement and inducement to civil strife in countries where the 
national cooperation is delicate and precarious.‖ [5] 
Lippmann believed that Truman had opened Pandora‘s box and that as a result the 
United States would face problems and tasks for which it was not equipped or well-
suited—problems that a prudent, hard-headed assessment of American vital interests 
and geopolitics would have avoided entirely. Truman‘s mistake rested on a flawed 
conception of Soviet motives and designs. When, a few months after Truman‘s speech, 
George Kennan‘s earth-rumbling essay ―The Sources of Soviet Conduct‖ appeared in 
Foreign Affairs, Lippmann took this to be the theoretical foundation of Truman‘s 
developing ―containment policy.‖ He reacted with fourteen columns analyzing and 
answering Kennan; these very influential essays were almost immediately published in 
book form as The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy. Lippmann‘s essays were 
prescient. 
Kennan argued that the Soviets were not open to persuasion through reason but would 
respond only to force. Driven by an ideologically motivated expansionism, the Soviets 
understood themselves to be in a war with noncommunist governments and therefore 
would not be open to compromise or peaceful coexistence. The only prudent strategy, 
Kennan and the Truman administration would spell out in due course, was to ―contain‖ 
the Soviets by countering their actions with counterforce. Kennan wanted Americans to 
understand the inherently expansionist and irrational nature of the Soviet regime so that 
they would be prepared to see all Soviet expansion as a threat to American security. 
However, Kennan also stressed that the Soviet regime was weak and that, when faced 
with a united front of free countries willing to check its expansionist enterprises across 
the globe, it would be vulnerable to its own internal instability. 
Lippmann, no dove, had no truck with pacifists like Henry Wallace. Like Kennan, 
Lippmann emphasized the necessity of American force in checking the Soviet Union. 
But Kennan and the Truman administration misunderstood the motives of the Soviet 
regime and the consequences of such a sweeping strategic vision for the United States. 
Kennan admitted that his was a theoretical rather than a historical or empirical 
argument, based on his understanding of the nature of the regime, not on the long 
experience of the Russian people. Lippmann preferred to rest American policy on the 
lessons of history rather than on improvable theory. Moreover, the containment policy 
would put the United States into a reactive strategic posture, giving the enemy the 
power to choose the ground of conflict and the weapons. 
Containment required that the United States devote enormous resources so that it was 
prepared to react in the remote corners of the world, but the American regime and its 
constitutional system was not suited to this strategy. A large military in times of peace, 
ceding power to the executive to respond rapidly to provocations, the public will to apply 
patient and steady pressure in areas distant—these were neither a part of the American 
tradition nor a strength of the constitutional system. Militarily, containment misused 
American assets. Our geography and circumstances encouraged the United States to 
produce a powerful navy and air force, with an army designed for offensive action rather 
than an occupying force. A good planner ―must use the kind of power we do have, not 
the kind we do not have.‖ [6] The containment policy committed American resources to 
conflicts that were not in our vital interests, for which we had the wrong assets, and 
required changes in domestic power relations that threatened to undermine our 
constitutional balances. 
For decades Lippmann had emphasized the importance of developing ―natural‖ 
alliances to protect vital interests. Mostly organized around the ―Atlantic community,‖ [7] 
Lippmann‘s emphasis on alliances concentrated American interests in Europe and the 
Americas, changing somewhat after the war to include a large part of the Pacific, but not 
the Asian mainland. By contrast, Truman‘s containment policy, Lippmann emphasized, 
―can be implemented only by recruiting, subsidizing, and supporting a heterogeneous 
array of satellites, clients, dependents and puppets. The instrument of the policy of 
containment is therefore a coalition of disorganized, disunited, feeble, or disorderly 
nations, tribes and factions around the perimeter of the Soviet Union.‖ [8] 
On this matter, Lippmann predicted the future very well. The barrier to contain the 
Soviets would then be made of weak allies who shared nothing in common with the 
United States except the shared desire to keep the Soviets, or their agents, out. 
―Satellite states and puppet governments are not good material out of which to construct 
unassailable barriers.‖ [9] In retrospect, Lippmann seems to be saying nothing more 
than the obvious. 
Inevitably, the coalition of weak and often barbarous regimes would produce civil strife, 
pulling the United States into the defense of unpalatable regimes whose defense serves 
no real American interest. The Atlantic community, [10] by contrast, served as a natural 
bloc of interested nations that, together through careful alliances, could exert pressures 
appropriate to their collective needs—in the immediate context to secure the economic 
health and viability of Europe, ensure a neutral Germany, and negotiate the withdrawal 
of the Red Army from central Europe. Similarly, Lippmann emphasized the ―natural‖ and 
understandable sphere of influence for a Russian-dominated Soviet Union. The Soviet 
leadership sought the same territorial gains that Russian leaders had sought for 
centuries. If ideology motivated them, then why did they not act in their first three 
decades in power? Perhaps, Lippmann averred, the real reasons for the Soviet 
expansion after 1945 were that they had won the war and they wanted the territorial 
security to prevent a fourth invasion from the West. In 1947 the Soviet sphere looked 
almost precisely the same as the one the Czarist regime had sought if they had won the 
Great War. 
The history of long-standing Russian desires for conquest and security helped us 
understand Soviet behavior better than Marxist ideology. The threat from the Soviets 
was real because the power of the Red Army was real—a huge occupying army guided 
by a regime that was largely insulated from public pressure and therefore capable of 
patience no democracy could match. In 1947 the Red Army was a major threat to 
America‘s vital interest because it allowed the Soviets to exercise ―an abnormal and 
intolerable influence in the affairs of the European continent.‖ [11] This, then, should be 
the focus of American power and diplomacy. More precisely, the goal was to evacuate 
from Europe the armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain, to use 
the Marshall Plan to foster stronger economic ties among principal partners of the 
Atlantic community, and to ensure a neutral and benign Germany that threatened 
neither the Soviet Union nor Western Europe. In defense of his own alternative to the 
Truman Doctrine, Lippmann declared: 
We shall have written off the liabilities of the Truman Doctrine which must in practice 
mean inexorably an unending intervention in all the countries that are supposed to 
‗contain‘ the Soviet Union. We shall be acting once more in the great American tradition 
which is to foster the independence of other countries, not to use other countries as the 
satellites of our own power, however beneficent, and as the instruments of our own 
policy, however well meant. Our aim will not be to organize an ideological crusade. It 
will not be to make Jeffersonian democrats out of peasants of eastern Europe, the tribal 
chieftains, the feudal lords, the pashas, and the warlords of the Middle East and Asia, 
but to settle the war and to restore the independence of the nations of Europe by 
removing the alien armies—all of them, our own included. [12] 
Lippmann wanted American policy makers to break free from simplified universal moral 
claims, born of a century of isolation and hardened in a new century of inescapable 
world conflict, and identify instead the nation‘s vital interests while developing the 
resources necessary to protect those interests. The Truman Doctrine presented a 
virulent form of American idealism, so concentrated on containing communism and on 
promoting democracy that it lost sight of both America‘s principled support for 
independence and the natural or logical community of alliances and relationships that 
should form our civilizational home and constitute the core of our vital interests. The 
liberal fundamentalism to which Truman gave voice would involve the United States in 
wars unconnected to our vital interests and would produce a form of democratic 
militarism in a time of peace that would alter the constitutional arrangements of power in 
the United States. 
V 
Historical comparisons come too easily today and we often lose sight of the particularity 
of each age, every event. I therefore risk a great deal as I offer some observations 
about Lippmann‘s mature foreign policy (shaped from the late ‘30s, when war clouds 
gathered, through the mid-‘50s when the Cold War became a long-term reality) as 
applied to America‘s policy today. Nonetheless, the policies and the justifying language 
of the Bush administration are consistent with the fundamentalism Lippmann decried in 
Wilson and Truman. And in the partisan academic and policy battles of our time, an 
independent mind, distant from the provincialism of our own time, offers an attractive 
alternative for those of us who sometimes want to wish a pox on all the houses of our 
competing schools of thought. 
Today, the most obvious expression of liberal fundamentalism is the Bush Doctrine, 
which bears a strong resemblance to the Truman Doctrine. The language with which 
George W. Bush presented the moral imperative of America‘s war against Islamic 
terrorists was grandiloquently democratic and imperially universalistic. Beyond a war for 
American security and the protection of her vital interests, the United States accepted 
her mission to promote democracy worldwide and with it the ―freedom‖ desired by every 
human heart. As Bush noted in his second inaugural address: 
We go forward with complete confidence in the eventual triumph of freedom. Not 
because history runs on the wheels of inevitability; it is human choices that move 
events. Not because we consider ourselves a chosen nation; God moves and chooses 
as He wills. We have confidence because freedom is the permanent hope of mankind, 
the hunger in dark places, the longing of the soul. When our Founders declared a new 
order of the ages; when soldiers died in wave upon wave for a union based on liberty; 
when citizens marched in peaceful outrage under the banner ―Freedom Now‖—they 
were acting on an ancient hope that is meant to be fulfilled. History has an ebb and flow 
of justice, but history also has a visible direction, set by liberty and the Author of Liberty. 
[13] 
Expressing himself also in a Manichean language that declared the evil of American 
enemies, Bush appealed frequently to the liberationist role of the American people, a 
role we are meant to play in an unredeemed world. 
To Lippmann, such declarations of America‘s role, alongside frequent references to the 
United States being the only superpower, not only distorted American idealism but also 
obligated the nation to causes it could not win and over which it had limited power. 
Lippmann insisted that Americans had a long tradition of loving independence and a 
willingness to fight for the independence of other nations, but that we could not impose 
a free or democratic order on a people once we freed them from foreign control. 
As had Truman before him, Bush wed this hyperbolic idealism to American security 
needs, threatening both our true ideals and our genuine security. We would defeat out 
enemies and protect our nation, and we would bring order, democracy, and free 
enterprise to darkened corners of the globe. Because the lack of democracy, freedom, 
and capitalism in those areas promoted the very ―extremism‖ that threatened our 
security, our fight could promote our security while fulfilling our destiny as an 
evangelizing force for democracy. Rather tidy. 
Bush‘s moral imperatives, alongside the specific policies that he established as 
doctrine, thrust the United States into potentially interminable conflicts for which we 
were ill-equipped, both militarily and culturally. Bush declared that the United States had 
the right to attack states that harbored terrorists and thereby expanded the reach of 
both American military power and the power of the executive branch beyond even what 
Truman had sought. Moreover, Bush determined that in the context of our present 
enemy preemptive war was justified, even if the threat to our national security was not 
demonstrably immediate. 
Lippmann insisted that a proper foreign policy be true to American ideals, that it be 
focused on the nation‘s vital interests, and that the policy make best use of the 
resources available. Fundamentalists reject the complexity of this arrangement because 
it requires serious accommodation to circumstances and a flexibility to adjust to 
changing conditions. Fundamentalists react to a new threat with simple declarations, 
drawn from the American experience but shorn of the mass of historical accumulations. 
But when the nation declares that its purpose is to make the world safe for democracy, 
to protect democracies throughout the world, or to promote democracy where no 
democratic seed has ever sprouted, it has placed itself in a role that it cannot fulfill, and 
with a constitutional system that does not encourage the patience necessary for 
continuous conflict in parts of the world so distant from America‘s cultural experience. 
Even our military has been designed for quick victories, to win with overwhelming air 
and sea power, but not to occupy for long periods of time foreign lands hostile to 
American troops. In short, the Bush Doctrine is a classic example of what Lippmann 
meant by American fundamentalism. 
Fundamentalism is a peculiar danger to democracies because a fundamentalist 
argument is a simple, abstract, and morally certain argument, which gives it force in a 
democratic debate—democratic politics do not encourage attention to details or 
complexity. Lippmann‘s frustration with the inability of the ―public‖ to deliberate or to 
become meaningfully informed about complex policy matters goes back to World War I 
and found powerful expression in his classic 1922 book Public Opinion. The problem is 
that modern democracies cannot deliberate and this fact puts pressure on leaders to try 
to shape public opinion, especially in times of crisis or challenge, with simple and easily 
digestible characterizations of events and options. All public expressions of policies, at 
least insofar as they will get widespread support, must translate complex and even 
paradoxical matters into a form that will match the capacity of the public to comprehend. 
The tendency to abstract from the wildly heterogeneous American experience a 
bumper-sticker ideal is a ubiquitous challenge, particularly in times of war or extreme 
trial. Fundamentalist simplification and abstraction are therefore the raw material for 
demagogues and for intellectually weak and provincial leaders who themselves fall prey 
to the lure of the simple, abstract, and morally certain. 
Our attention has necessarily focused on the Bush Doctrine, but we ought to note that 
the charge of fundamentalism, as used by Lippmann, applies to most of the vocal 
participants in our public debate about post-9/11 foreign policy. Antiwar advocates are 
as reductionist, as moralistic, and as certain of their position as the most bombastic 
supporter of the Bush Doctrine. The American experience is broad and complex enough 
to allow many abstracted versions of the American self to find expression. But the 
difference is that the Bush Doctrine, and especially the specific arguments developed by 
neoconservatives, are very much expressions of a liberal fundamentalism that began 
with Woodrow Wilson and runs through Franklin Roosevelt‘s ―four freedoms,‖ the 
Truman Doctrine, to the current administration. 
There are many fundamentalisms that vie for public support, expressing abstract, 
moralistic claims from most points on the American ideological compass. The one that 
provoked Walter Lippmann to devote great energy fighting is what I‘ve called ―liberal‖ 
fundamentalism because of its belief in the moral superiority of liberal democracy and 
the accompanying evangelical role for the United States. If Lippmann‘s critique has 
currency today it is because the same failures he examined in American foreign policy 
from Wilson through Truman are at work today. To the degree that he was correct, an 
attempt to give some systematic expression of Lippmann‘s principles for an American 
foreign policy offers an alternative way of thinking about America and her role, or way, 
in the world. 
VI 
Stated succinctly, Lippmann‘s foreign policy requires that American policy makers 
determine America‘s vital interests and cultivate the proper alliances and relationships 
necessary to protect those interests. In the process of determining our interests, 
American leaders need to understand the legitimate security interests of other great 
powers and they should expect those powers to take measures to secure their interests. 
This does not mean that regime type or ideology is unimportant, but rather that a deep 
understanding of both historical realities and perceived national interests are primary 
factors in understanding the motivations and the actions of great powers. The tendency 
to think ideologically—to define America by its most lofty ideals of universal freedom 
and to understand enemies solely in terms of their ideological statements of purpose—
pushes American policy makers to plan for total victory, to end the conflict for good, 
rather than to plan for the ever-changing security needs. [14] Less ideological in their 
thinking, American leaders must also devise a security strategy that takes into account 
available resources, including a military that is designed primarily for offensive action 
rather than occupation or pacification, and a political culture that is both idealistic and 
impatient. 
One discovers the truly interesting part of Lippmann‘s analysis, however, as one 
unpacks the meaning of ―vital interests‖ and by exploring his persistent argument in 
favor of the ―Atlantic community,‖ to which America ―naturally‖ belonged. A powerful 
blend of what we often label realism and idealism rests at the core of Lippmann‘s 
understanding of American foreign policy and even ―American destiny.‖ This 
dispassionate and analytical thinker, so long the distant and ironic observer of politics 
and culture, had begun to think more like a prophet as war ravaged most of the earth 
and then as rumors of war threatened an end to all civilization. At mid-century, 
Lippmann‘s writings on foreign policy hinted at his fears about a possible collapse of 
American civilization, and with it Western civilization. And in due course, after much 
delay, Lippmann published Essays in the Public Philosophy, sending his former 
progressive allies into paroxysm and Lippmann into the hospital. [15] Fearful that liberal 
democracy was sick and that it had lost touch with the principles that nourished it, 
Lippmann wrote this strange book in an almost plaintive manner, calling for a recovery 
of the principles of Western civilization and natural law. 
Lippmann‘s foreign policy and his political philosophy were part of the same project and 
were spawned by the same fears. The quotation with which Part I of this essay begins, 
written in 1944, introduced Lippmann‘s grave concerns. ―Fate,‖ he wrote, ―has brought it 
about that America is at the center, no longer the edges, of Western civilization. In this 
fact resides the American destiny.‖ Put more starkly, the fate of Western civilization 
depended on America and America‘s survival depended on promoting a healthy 
economic, cultural, and military alliance with the various members of the ―Atlantic 
community‖ who now constituted the civilizational arc that radiated from American 
shores. As he noted, the Atlantic was the new Mediterranean and those cultures in this 
community of nations were the cultural descendents of the ancient humanism that 
sprang from the myriad experiences of the Hebrews, the Greeks, and the Romans. 
In language rather unusual for this agnostic, Lippmann evoked providence in several 
places and wrote: ―The American idea is not an eccentricity in the history of mankind. It 
is the hope and a pledge of fulfillment.‖ Moreover, he continued, ―The American idea is 
founded upon an image of man and on his place in the universe, of his reason and his 
will, his knowledge of good and evil, his hope of a higher and a natural law which is 
above all governments, and indeed of all particular laws.‖ [16] As a world war raged, 
Lippmann ruminated about America and the perils of Western civilization. However else 
one may describe these thoughts, they were most certainly idealistic. 
So what are America‘s vital interests and what species of idealism is consistent with 
Lippmann‘s steely-eyed realism? 
Our vital interests begin with economic ties and needs. When Lippmann began using 
the term, he noted that war with Germany in 1917 became a necessity because they 
threatened America‘s vital trading relationships and its economic health. No meaningful 
definition of our vital interests can exclude key trading relationships and natural security 
arrangements that connect the interests of several nations. However difficult it is to 
calculate or even to define these realistic (nonidealistic) parts of a nation‘s vital 
interests, the truly great challenge facing American policy makers at mid-century was to 
identify the idealistic, the civilizational or cultural parts of America‘s vital interest. 
Lippmann believed that Western and, by extension, American civilization was the 
product, perhaps of providence, but clearly of great genius, great effort, and thousands 
of years of experience. The results were astonishing, a civilization grounded on reason 
and individual freedom, connected to the highest expressions of human purpose and 
meaning, and to a compelling argument about the relationship between higher authority 
and individual autonomy and freedom. That civilization, and the liberal political regime it 
produced, cannot be transplanted easily to other parts of the world. It is a cultural 
species particular to a cluster of peoples and to a part of the world where such beliefs, 
habits, and values took root. 
Lippmann‘s understanding of the highest objective of both contemporary American 
political philosophy and American foreign policy is the PRESERVATION of Western and 
American civilization, not its exportation. Lippmann‘s idealism was connected to his 
affirmation of the good of Western civilization and not to a very narrow and promiscuous 
idea about the universality of democracy and individual freedom. If the fundamentalists 
sought to evangelize the world with a very thin version of Western civilization, 
abstracted from the very complex historical and experiential sources, Lippmann argued 
instead for a foreign policy aimed at building the relationships that preserve the rich and 
complex patrimony of the West. 
As a civilization and as nations with economic and geopolitical interests, the Atlantic 
community has interests and ideals that other nations or cultures will challenge and 
even disrupt. Policy makers must understand the needs of those other nations and 
cultures from the point of view of their history and circumstances and allow them the 
spheres of power and influence that are necessary, while building the military, the 
alliances, the willpower, to protect American interests when (as they inevitably will) 
these are threatened. If we are driven by a liberal fundamentalism and find ourselves 
involved in nation-building, in regional conflicts outside of our vital interests, and in 
alliances with puppet regimes or unsavory partners, the United States will not only 
forsake its vital interests but will also find itself involved in seemingly interminable 
conflicts with unclear objectives. 
The case made by so many that our current conflict is unlike earlier wars is strong and 
the myriad questions about the applicability of Lippmann‘s mid-century foreign policy to 
the war against Islamic terrorists are difficult to sort out, and beyond the scope of this 
essay. Moreover, the always unresolved problem with Lippmann‘s analysis is that 
democracies do not foster understanding or appreciation of the complexity and nuance 
that he thinks necessary for any serious deliberation about policy. Lippmann‘s advice 
can only be directed to those few who have the power to make choices and to frame the 
meaning of those choices for a public that can only receive views, not construct them. 
Nonetheless, Lippmann‘s critique of fundamentalists is strikingly applicable to the Bush 
administration and offers up a way of thinking about recent events that doesn‘t fit into 
the neoconservative or realist or isolationist camps. Lippmann‘s advocacy of a muscular 
defense of our cultural, economic, and security interests offers a valuable alternative to 
the battling books of our time. Clearly, Lippmann would not have found any end-of-
history argument appealing while his own analysis aims at a somewhat different version 
of the clash-of-civilizations thesis. And if we take Lippmann‘s version seriously, then the 
United States, Western Europe, and other parts of the Atlantic community are risking 
their own cultural survival when they fail to cultivate properly the civilizational ties that 
bind them. Lippmann would have us to be defenders of the faith, not evangelists. 
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